Opinion • Huáscar Salazar Lohman • July 5, 2024 • Leer en castellano

On June 26, an enigmatic military action took place in Murillo Plaza that plunged Bolivia into uncertainty. For two and a half hours, the country waited with bated breath as it tried to make sense of the events unfolding in the political heart of La Paz.

The threat of military intervention had interrupted the rhythm of Bolivian politics once again. The scene was as baffling as it was distressing, bordering on the surreal. A barrage of fragmented, contradictory and disconcerting reports flooded the media. This continued for several days, as news outlets published contextless facts, released in an effort to support one narrative of the events or the other, without actually clarifying anything about the overall situation. 

Today a battle of narratives divides and distracts Bolivians. From the "coup/fraud" debate, we moved to a new framing, that of "coup/self-coup." But the struggle over narratives obscures what actually happened and exacerbates a searing economic crisis that hits the working class hardest.

To make sense of these events, we have to go beyond the debate over these narratives and address the role of the army. The armed forces have become the cornerstone of a political scene defined by a broken federal government and a corresponding weakened social fabric.

What happened on June 26?

On the afternoon of June 26, General Juan José Zúñiga, who is known as an ally of President Luis Arce but who was recently dismissed for publicly threatening Evo Morales, was the central figure in this unusual episode. 

Accompanied by a group of loyal officers, Zúñiga scolded Bolivia's president for allegedly harming the country. He also demanded changes to the cabinet and the release of prisoners that he considered “political,” including former president Jeanine Añez and the Santa Cruz reactionary Luis Fernando Camacho.

Tensions peaked when Zúñiga and his men stormed Plaza Murillo in La Paz and rammed a tank into the door of the presidential palace. In a moment of high drama, President Arce confronted the general, demanding his subordination.

Faced with Zuñiga's refusal, Arce responded by appointing a new military high command, thus confirming Zuñiga's removal, and also by removing the heads of the navy and the air force. The situation shifted in a matter of minutes. The tanks retreated and the president celebrated his victory with an effusive speech..

Although it was all over quickly, events left a trail of doubt. Authorities arrested Zúñiga, but not before he made an explosive allegation: Arce himself had orchestrated the incident to bolster his public image. Supporters of Evo Morales and other opponents seized on this claim and quickly characterized what took place as a "self-coup."

As images of the tank in front of the government palace went viral on social networks and in the traditional media, panic reigned in the Bolivian streets, especially in La Paz. 

Rather than rushing out to "defend democracy," people hurried to brace themselves for what could be a prolonged conflict. There were long lines in the markets, at ATMs and at gas stations. Recalling the events of 2019, people tried to prepare for the worst.

Politics organizing confusion 

There are multiple hypotheses about what took place that day. The divide in the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) between factions loyal to Evo Morales and those loyal to Arce makes things even more confusing. Both men hope to win the party’s nomination for next year’s elections.

The official version identifies General Zúñiga as the instigator of a coup attempt, motivated by his recent dismissal. At the other extreme, opponents accuse President Luis Arce of orchestrating a failed "self-coup" to boost his popularity. 

However, racking our brains in an effort to decipher which of these versions is "true" is a distraction that obscures the armed force’s increasing centrality in Bolivian politics.

These events are similar to what occurred in 2019, during the political crisis that erupted after the failed general elections, and that resulted in Evo Morales’s resignation and clashes among civilians and a violent crackdown by the armed forces and the national police. At the time, this was presented to us as a set of confusing and indecipherable fragments, just as is happening now.

This framing is designed to force us to choose between simplistic narratives that favor one side or the other. These narratives elevate one caudillo and demonize another, while deepening polarization and silencing critical voices.

To paraphrase Marx, what happened on June 26, 2024 repeated the tragedy of 2019 but this time as farce. It is imperative to build a deeper analysis that breaks with the demobilizing inertia of this political dynamic.

Driving the country into the ground

Bolivia is in the midst of a deep economic crisis that has grown more intense in recent months. The shortage of foreign currency, difficulties in acquiring fuel, labor precarity and the increased cost of basic foodstuffs are symptoms of a structural problem: the country's dependence on extractivism, which has been hard hit by the fall in the value of gas exports.

In this context, the events of June 26 were "a blow to Bolivian society," as feminist María Galindo points out. The military’s brief but shocking presence in the streets triggered a chain reaction of adverse economic consequences, exacerbating panic in a society that is already overwhelmed by crisis.

Over the last decade, the federal government has been irresponsible with national resources and prioritized partisan interests over collective wellbeing. This has led to a sharp erosion of institutions and a weakening of community structures that have historically acted as a bulwark against state violence.

The disregard of the 2016 referendum, which sought to prevent unlimited reelection, is an example of the institutional breakdown. At that time, the MAS deployed various maneuvers in an effort to impose Morales as its candidate once again, undermining the credibility of key institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Electoral Tribunal. This fuelled a resurgence of the most rancid elements of the right wing, which tried to shore up its political position by calling for the “recovery of democracy.”

The state’s decay is only getting worse as time goes on. The unconstitutional extension of the mandates of judicial magistrates, who have acted in alliance with the Arce administration, is evidence of this.

The discretional management of degraded institutions has created an environment of unmitigated tension while also encouraging disinformation and the use of violence as a disciplining mechanism. 

Political breakdown and military protagonism

At the end of 2022, Jorge Richter, who was then President Arce’s spokesperson, made a revealing statement about the role of the armed forces in Bolivia. He said the government could not cut the military budget because "the balance of power resides in" that institution.

Richter's assertion exposed how important the Bolivian armed forces have become. They are the bullies who make it possible to hold on to power.

In recent years, we have watched as the armed forces have taken on tasks that fall outside their constitutional mandate, from commenting on politics to deploying troops without authorization and even to insisting that the president resign.

This behavior suggests that the armed forces do not operate autonomously but rather in unofficial alliances with powerful political actors. 

The armed force’s growing interference in the civic life sphere is a threat because it could normalize the military’s presence in daily affairs. Even more troubling is that the balance of political power in the country appears to depend increasingly on the military and its support for specific leaders or factions. 

This dynamic could overrun formal democratic systems and other forms of autonomous organization. The military’s influence might eclipse democratic processes and social autonomy, thus profoundly altering political life in the country.

Against the armed forces

In Bolivia, the armed forces are the golden child of public institutions. In part, this is true because of the privileges that they enjoy. They are the only workers who retire with pensions that pay 100 percent of their salaries, among other benefits. And annual military spending increased from $164 million to $672 million between 2005 and 2022.  Despite the deterioration of economic indicators over the last seven years, military budgets have remained a priority.

Given these circumstances, promoting reforms that encourage the armed forces to stay in their barracks and that reduce their numbers could help us break the paralyzing dynamics of so much confusion. 

Military reforms could also include the elimination of compulsory military service, curtailing the armed forces’ judicial and economic privileges, and restructuring of the military’s internal hierarchy.

There was a challenge to the traditional structure of the Bolivian armed forces in 2014. Non-commissioned officers and sergeants, backed by the Ponchos Rojos—an Aymara militia that has repeatedly supported the MAS government over the last decade—demanded a "decolonizing" reform of the military.

Their main goal was to eliminate the hierarchical division of the armed forces into non-commissioned officers and sergeants, on the one hand, and officers, on the other. This system, which is present in most of the world's armies, encourages the existence of a military elite, which ends up managing alliances between the armed forces, dominant classes and political elites.

The reformers wanted to implement an egalitarian system for military promotions. The Morales administration, in one of the most conservative decisions of its period in office, responded by threatening to dismiss all the NCOs and sergeants involved in the protest. The government’s reaction revealed its fear of altering the military status quo, even though this flatly contradicted its rhetoric of social transformation.

The 2014 attempt at military reform had shortcomings, but nonetheless made it clear that changes in the armed forces are both necessary and possible and that pushing for them can be an effective means of social struggle. 

Curbing the growing power of the armed forces takes place outside the frameworks of polarizing politics in which we are consistently being constrained. Doing so today could mark a renewed effort to confront the putrid decay of the Bolivian state.